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ABSTRACT 
Making use of the numerous resources available to them, 
incumbent congressmen have come to enjoy very high rates of success in 
getting reelected. Typically, however, incumbents are challenged by 
relatively weak, unknown candidates, while potentially much stronger 
candidates are deterred. So why do these weak candidates engage in 
such apparently foolish behavior? 
Previous research has suggested several answers to this 
question. It is commonly argued that weak, inexperienced candidates 
either misperceive the odds against them, or that they are actually 
using a congressional campaign to pursue nonpolitical goals or 
political goals other than winning office. Others point out that weak 
candidates may be induced to run by a low probability of victory 
because their political opportunity costs are low or because a 
stronger than expected showing may serve as an investment in future 
campaigns. This paper argues, however, that there is a much simpler 
and direct reason why weak candidates choose to run against 
incumbents, and that is that they do so so as to maximize their 
probability of being elected to Congress. 
THE RATIONALITY OF CANDIDATES WHO CHALLENGE 
INCUMBENTS IN CONGRESSIONAL ELECTIONS 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Research on congressional elections has repeatedly documented 
a very curious phenomenon: the candidates who are most likely to run 
against incumbent congressmen are generally those who are least likely 
t-0 win (Leuthold, 1968; Huckshorn and Spencer, 1971; Mann and 
Wolfinger, 1980; Jacobson, 1980a, 1980b; Jacobson and Kernell, 1981). 
Where potentially much stronger candidates are unnerved by the 
prospect of trying to unseat an entrenched incumbent, unknown and 
inexperienced challengers enter the fray, usually launching 
themselves, as Maisel (1982) puts it, from obscurity to oblivion. Why 
do these people engage in such apparently foolhardy behavior? The 
purpose of this paper is to argue that their behavior is rational in a 
simpler and more direct way than has previously been suggested. In 
presenting this argument it is probably best to begin with a quick 
overview of previous research in this area. 
II. PREVIOUS RESEARCH: THE ADVANTAGES OF INCUMBENCY 
During the last decade or so one of the most heavily tilled 
(if not over-tilled) fields of inquiry in political science has been 
congressional elections. The product of this work is a large and 
important body of knowledge about the nature of competition for these 
43S positions. Above all, research in this area has documented the 
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overwhelming importance of one variable--incumbency. Over the past few 
decades close to 9S percent of the incumbent congressmen seeking 
reelection have been successful. Moreover, as Mayhew (1974a) 
graphically demonstrated, their victories have become increasingly 
lopsided; by now "marginal" districts (conventionally defined as those 
in which the winner attained less than S S  percent of the vote) are 
clearly an endangered species. 
Other studies, seeking to explain why this state of affairs 
has come to be, have identified the awesome array of resources that 
incumbents possess to employ against potential challengers. Many 
advantages inhere in the office itself. First, key institutional 
features of Congress allow them to maximize the political benefits and 
to minimize the political risks which public policymaking entails 
(Mayhew, 1974b).1 Chief among these features is the proliferation of
committees. The existence of dozens of committees and well over a 
hundred subcommittees, each with a chairman, produces a specialization 
of policymaking expertise and disaggregation of power. Th.is 
facilitates individual credit-claiming, which in turns boosts 
electoral prospects. As Mayhew put it, "Whatever else it may be, the 
quest for specialization in Congress is a quest for credit. Every 
member can aspire to occupy a part of at least one policy turf small 
enough so that he can claim personal responsibility for some of the 
things that happen on it" (p.9S). 
Similarly, the single-member district electoral system grants 
to each incumbent a corner on the local market for the goods known 
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variously as "bureaucratic unsticking services," "constituency 
service,n or " case work" (Fiorina, 1977, 1979). Moreover, the 
incumbents' office allowances permit them to hire a large staff to 
assist in providing such services. The taxpayers also pick up the tab 
for the franking privilege, which can be used to drum up new business, 
supply baby books and other useful items, or to provide "political 
education" to constituents, e.g., what the congressman has done for 
them lately (Cover, 1978; Cover and Brumberg, 1982). 
Thirdly,simply being an incumbent congressmen generally allows 
one relatively sure and easy access to the local mass media and thus a 
level of public exposure and public awareness (usually highly 
favorable) that nonincumbent candidates can only covet (Mann, 1978; 
Mann and Wolfinger, 1980). Incumbents also have a much easier time 
raising campaign funds. As Jacobson and Kernell (1981) point out, 
what contributors want in return for their money is influence, and 
most feel that funding a politician who is already in Congress is a 
much sounder investment than giving money to one who simply wants to 
be there. Indeed, incumbents can often be quite picky in deciding 
which contributions to solicit and accept, confident that they can 
raise whatever amount is needed to assure another victory. 
As if this is not enough, certain features of the strategic 
environment in which potential congressional challengers operate play 
strongly to the incumbents' advantage. This environment is analyzed 
most thoroughly by Jacobson and Kernell (1981). First, these authors 
present evidence showing that the strongest nonincumbent candidates 
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for Congress typically are men and women who are currently in the 
state legislature or who hold a similarly important elective office 
(see Table 2:1 from their book, reproduced here). 
TABLE 2 .1 
AVERAGE VOTE RECEIVED BY HOUSE CHALLENGERS WITH AND WITHOUT 
ELECTORAL OFFICE EXPERIENCE, 1972-1978 
Prior Elective Office: 
Democrats 
Yes No 
Average Percentage of Two-Party Vote Received 
1972 39 .6 33.7 
1974 45 .9 41.6 
1976 39 .3 35.0 
1978 39.8 32.2 
Republicans 
Yes No 
39.7 32.4 
37.1 27.6 
40.1 31.5 
43 .9 32.4 
That this is so is not surprising; such candidates are more likely to 
have some modicum of visibility in the district, more access to 
campaign contributions, and a larger cadre of volunteer workers and 
other supporters. But as Jacobson and Kernell point out, these strong 
potential candidates must, in general, forfeit their present office in 
order to run for Congress. Moreover, in the essentially Darwinian 
struggle for political office in this country, a defeat at the polls 
is extremely damaging, if not fatal, to someone at this stage of their 
political career.2 
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This being the case, this better class of candidates will be 
willing to give up their current off ice in order to challenge an 
incumbent only under very favorable circumstances. A disastrous year 
for the incumbent President will spawn a relatively large number of 
strong challenges against incumbent congressmen of the President's 
party. 3 Incumbents who choose to run despite having been touched by 
scandal or having performed a highly unpopular action, e. g. , voting 
not to impeach Nixon, can also expect particularly experienced, well­
funded opponents (Wright, 1977; Mann, 1978). In general, though, 
potentially strong challengers with high political opportunity costs 
will prefer to postpone their run for Congress until the incumbent, 
for one reason or another, e. g. , retirement, ill health, a run at a 
Senate seat, decides not to run for reelection. A contest for an open 
seat, after all, usually promises to be a battle fought on roughly 
equal footing with an opponent similar to oneself in resources and 
experience. This is obviously a much more appealing prospect than 
giving up an office which was itself very hard to attain in return for 
a shot at unseating an entrenched incumbent. 
In short, incumbents greatly benefit from the strategic 
environment of American electoral politics. Their strongest potential 
opponents will prefer to wait gracefully on the sidelines until the 
incumbents decide it is time to quit. The moral of this story, then, 
is pretty clear. Only mad dogs and Englishmen go out in the noonday 
sun, and only turkeys challenge incumbents. 
III. WHY THE TURKEYS ARE RATIONAL 
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All in all, this account of contemporary congressional 
elections is quite compelling. There is no cause to quarrel with most 
of the major facts or explanations. There is, however, one aspect of 
it which is troubling, and that is that there is apparently no 
shortage of turkeys. Although incumbents are rarely defeated, it is 
also the case that they rarely are reelected without opposition. In 
1978, for instance, only 43 of the 371 incumbents running for 
reelection ran unopposed in both their primary and general election 
contests. And, for the most part, it was the relatively weak 
candidates who challenged them; only 12.6 percent of these challengers 
were holding elective office at the time of the election, compared to 
47. 1 percent of the candidates running for open seats (Jacobson, 
1980b). Only a little over 5 percent of them managed to upend the 
incumbent. So why do these weak challengers enter a contest they have 
so little chance of winning? 
Previous research has generated a fairly large number of 
answers to this question. One oft-cited answer is that such 
challengers are irrational, or at least are not very bright; weak 
challengers taking on incumbents, it is claimed, delude themselves 
into wishfully thinking that their probability of winning is much 
higher than it actually is (Leuthold, 1968; Kazee, 1980; Maisel, 
1982). Most analyses of these candidates' decisions to run, however, 
posit that they were fully aware that they would most probably lose 
but ran in order to pursue other goals. Some candidates who had 
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little chance of defeating their incumbent opponent claim to have run 
out of a sense of duty to their party; although they themselves had 
little chance of winning, they felt that they would aid the party's 
candidates for other offices who would otherwise be "pulled down" by 
the absence of a congressional candidate on the ballot (Kazee, 1980; 
Cavanagh, 1981). There are also those who report that they ran 
because a congressional campaign serves as an excellent forum to 
present deeply held views on major issues (Maisel, 1982). Others make 
the post hoc assertion that their unsuccessful run for office was a 
personally enriching and valuable experience (Kazee, 1980). 
Similarly, some challengers with slim prospects of winning might run 
because they believe the publicity of a congressional campaign will 
benefit their nonpolitical careers (Leuthold , 1968; Schlesinger, 1966; 
Buckshorn and Spencer, 1971).4 
There are reasons cited, however, which derive from cost­
benefit calculations which are strictly political in nature. One such 
explanation of challengers' behavior is that they view their campaign 
against the incumbent as an investment in a hopefully successful 
future campaign. By running a strong though unsuccessful race against 
the incumbent a challenger can hope to build up some name recognition 
and enhance his or her fund -raising capability (especially if the race 
was close enough to identify the incumbent as vulnerable and the 
district as marginal (Huckshorn and Spencer, 1971). Even better, a 
strong challenge may even persuade the incumbent that the office is 
not worth another costly fight which might end in an embarrassing 
defeat, and that retirement is preferable. In this case the 
challenger will be in an excellent position to win the open seat. 
Indeed, a large number of those who have been elected to Congress in 
recent decades had made at least one unsuccessful attempt before 
succeeding (Fenno, 1978). 
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Similarly, Kernell and Jacobson (1981) point out that weak 
candidates have relatively low political opportunity costs. in that 
they need not cash in a presently held office in order to run. This 
is true, of course, and because of it such candidates can be induced 
to run by a considerably lower probability of winning. It is not. 
however, differences in opportunity costs which are responsible for 
the pattern of congressional competition which we are interested in 
explaining. Strong potential challengers who currently hold other 
elective offices face the same opportunity costs whether they run 
against an incumbent or wait for an open seat; the reason why they are 
inclined to wait for an open seat is that they want to maximize their 
probability of getting elected to Congress. And although it probably 
sounds surprising, it will be argued here that weak congressional 
challengers choose to run against incumbents for the very same reason, 
i.e • • to maximize the probability of their being elected to Congress. 
The key to understanding why this may be the case is to keep 
in mind the fact that in order to get to Congress candidates must do 
more than simply win the general election in their district. They 
must first defeat any and all other opponents from their own party in 
the primary election. For obscure candidates who have never 
previously held an elected office, the product of these two 
probabilities (of winning the primary election and then winning the 
general election), may indeed be higher when the general election 
opponent is an incumbent congressman. The following simple example 
demonstrates a case in which this is so. 
9 
Assume that there is a congressional district in which the 
Republican incumbent is running for his fourth term. It is well-known 
in the district that he desires to serve one more term before making a 
run at a Senate seat which will open up in two years. In the 
Democratic ranks there are two potential challengers. The first is a 
popular state senator from a district which largely coincides with the 
congressional district. The second is a virtually unknown lawyer who 
has never campaigned for nor been elected to public office. Let us 
assume that the probability of the second Democrat defeating the 
incumbent is the average rate of success candidates running against 
incumbents have had over the past decade�6 percent�and that the much 
stronger first Democrat would have twice as good a chance, i.e. , 12 
percent. Let us also assume that having won the nomination the first, 
stronger candidate would have a 60 percent chance of winning an open 
seat in this district, while the second, weaker candidate would have a 
40 percent chance of defeating a nonincumbent Republican opponent. 
Similarly, assume that the lawyer would have only a small, 10 percent 
probability of defeating the state senator in a Democratic primary, 
but that both would have a 100 percent probability of winning the 
primary if they ran unopposed. One other factor which the two 
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candidates must take into account is the fact that if they wait to run 
for the open seat and the other Democratic candidate does not, there 
is some chance that the other candidate will defeat the incumbent. We 
will assume that if this happens the candidate who waited will be 
precluded from running in the second election against the new 
incumbent of his own party. The probability of getting to Congress 
for a candidate following such a strategy is thus reduced by the 
probability of the other Democratic challenger defeating the incumbent 
in the first election. 
The only assumptions about costs (opportunity or otherwise) 
that need to be made are that the respective costs each candidate 
faces are identical in both elections, and in any case are not high 
enough to rule out at least one attempt at Congress. However, it will 
be assumed that for both candidates a defeat would terminate their 
political career. Finally, it also needs to be assumed that neither 
candidate has a discount rate that is ridiculously high. 
This situation, then, can be seen as a noncooperative, perfect 
information game between the two potential Democratic challengers. 
Each can make one of two moves: run now when the incumbent is running 
for reelection, or run next time for the open seat. This game is 
displayed below in Figure 1. The payoffs which are reported in each 
cell are the probabilities of the candidates achieving election to 
Congress, and are simply the products of the different probabilities 
of winning the p�imary, winning the general election, and, if the 
candidate waited to run for the open seat and the other 
FIGURE 1 
A GAME BETWEEN TWO CONGRESSIONAL CANDIDATES FROM THE SAME PARTY 
STRONG 
CHALLENGER 
RUN NOW VS. 
INCUMBENT 
RUN NEXT TIME 
FOR OPEN SEAT 
WEAK 
CHALLENGER 
RUN NOW VS. 
INCUMBENT 
10.8'11, 0.6'11 
56 .4'11, 6  .0'11 
RUN NEXT TDIE 
FOR OPEN SEAT 
12.0'll, 35 .2'11 
54.0'll, 4.0'll 
did not, of the other candidate defeating the incumbent. As is 
customary, the first payoff reported in each cell is for the row 
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player (the strong challenger), the second for the column player (the 
weak challenger).5 
It is clear that the strong Democratic challenger has a 
dominant strategy--wait and run next time for the open seat. 
Regardless of what the weak challenger does, the strong challenger's 
probability of getting elected is much higher than if he were to run 
now. However, because of the small chance he would have of winning a 
primary, the best thing for the weak challenger to do is to run 
whenever the strong challenger is not running and thus sail through 
the primary unopposed. Obviously he would pref er the strong 
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challenger to run now and take on the incumbent, while he waited to 
run for the open seat. He knows, however, that the strong challenger 
is going to wait and run next time for the open seat regardless of 
what he does. The weak challenger will thus maximize his probability 
of getting to Congress by running now against the incumbent. To be 
sure, this probability is not very high (6 percent), but he is 
maximizing it.6 
This game, of course, portrays a very simple strategic 
environment. There are, however, a number of other observations which 
can be made. First, there can be a fairly large number of strong 
potential challengers present before any of them would have an 
incentive to run against the incumbent. Say, for example, there were 
3 potential candidates with the same general election prospects as the 
strong challenger here, i.e., a 12 percent chance of defeating the 
incumbent, a 60 percent chance of taking the open seat, and that each 
had a 30 percent chance of winning a primary in which they all 
participated. Each would still have a considerably higher probability 
of getting to Congress by waiting for the open seat than by 
challenging the incumbent. Similarly, the incumbent would have to be 
a great deal more vulnerable than the one in this example (who had a 
12 percent chance of being beaten by a strong challenger) before a 
strong challenger would actually choose to run against him. 
And despite its simplicity, this game does appear to capture 
pretty well the major features of the pattern of competition in 
congressional primary elections. Figures presented by Jacobson 
(1980b) indicate that candidates running against incumbents are, as 
indicated earlier, far less likely to hold another elective office 
(and thus tend to be much weaker challengers). They are also 
considerably more likely to be unopposed in their primaries (see 
Table 1 from Jacobson, 1980b, reproduced here). 
[TABLE 1 HERE] 
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One obvious and important way to expand this game would be to 
include another key player--the incumbent. For instance, if it 
appeared likely that the incumbent was going to run for reelection 
several more times before retiring or moving on, the strong potential 
challengers' incentives to wait for the seat to open up would decline. 
Ceteris paribus, such an incumbent might have a higher probability of 
facing a strong challenger. On the other hand, in such a case strong 
potential challengers may choose instead to run for governorships, 
state cabinet positions, or other offices. Whatever the case, this 
little game does suggest that incumbents could adopt an optimal 
strategy of announcing their retirement (e. g. after one more term, two 
more terms, or whatever) so as to minimize the probability of facing a 
strong challenger. 
Another way to expand the game would be to enlarge the number 
of strategies available, especially for the weak challengers. It was 
assumed here that the weak challenger wanted to go immediately to 
Congress, and was merely deciding whether to run now or run later. 
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TABLE 1 
A COMPARISON OF HOUSE CHALLENGERS AND CANDIDATES FOR OPEN SEATS 
Percentage of Candidates 
With Primary Election Contests 
1972 
1974 
1976 
1978 
Candidates Challenging 
Incumbents 
46. 3 
45 . 9  
4 3  . 7
44.3 
Percentage of Candidates Holding 
Elective Offfice At Time of the Election 
1972 16 .3 
1974 18. 1 
1976 12. 5 
1978 12.6 
Candidates for 
Open Seats 
74.2 
86 . 6  
7 5  .o 
79 .5 
33 .o 
37.S 
42 . 1 
47.1 
Another alternative, however, would be to attempt to climb the 
political ladder fewer rungs at a time (e. g., first city council, then 
the state house, then Congress). Doing this, he or she would have 
thus become a strong candidate for Congress, which is clearly better 
than being a weak candidate. The probability of getting to this 
point, however, would be the product of the probabilities of winning a 
series of lesser offices, and would also take longer. Moreover, there 
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may be important differences between politicians who pursue this sort 
of strategy and those who shoot directly for a high off ice such as 
congressman. The latter group might be less risk averse, or they 
might also be more ambitious; evidence presented by Rohde (1979) 
indicates that congressmen who first got to Congress by challenging 
and defeating an incumbent are more likely to try for a Senate seat. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Previous research has suggested several reasons why weak 
candidates with little chance of winning run for Congress. It is 
commonly argued that such candidates either misperceive the odds 
against them, or that they are actually using a congressional campaign 
to pursue nonpolitical goals or political goals other than winning 
office. Others point out that weak candidates may be induced to run 
by a low probability of victory because their political opportunity 
costs are low or because a stronger than expected showing may serve as 
an investment in future campaigns. 
It is almost surely the case that all of the above reasons 
contribute to the decisions of unknown, inexperienced candidates to 
run for Congress. This paper has argued, however, that there is a 
much simpler and direct reason why weak candidates choose to run 
against incumbents. Given the strategic environment which they face, 
challenging an incumbent may maximize the probability of their getting 
elected to Congress. This is because the current incumbent is not the 
only opponent potential challengers must take into account. To get to 
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Congress they must first defeat any and all other candidates of their 
own party. The likelihood of defeating an incumbent congressman is 
obviously very low, but a candidate who chooses to challenge an 
incumbent will likely avoid serious opposition in the primary. A 
candidate who instead waits for a seat to open up faces the additional 
hurdle of winning a primary against one or more strong candidates of 
his own party. For unknown, inexperienced candidates, the prospects 
of getting to Congress may be brighter in the former situation than in 
the latter. 
1. 
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FOOlNOTES 
As Mayhew put it, • • • •  if a group of plaILD.ers sat down and tried 
to design a pair of American national assemblies with the goal of 
servicing members' electoral needs year in and year out. they 
would be hard pressed to improve on what exists" (p. 81-82). 
2. In contrast to this situation. a new, unproven candidate without 
prior experience in public office can often enhance his or her 
future electoral prospects by running a strong though 
unsuccessful race against an incumbent. More will be said about 
this point later on in this paper. 
3. The major thesis of Jacobson and Kernell's book is that the 
strong positive correlation between the state of the national 
economy and the electoral fortunes of congressional candidates of 
the President's party results much less from the reaction of 
individual voters to the economy than from the anticipated 
reaction of congressional candidates and campaign contributors to 
the likely mood of the voters. The evidence they present does 
indicate that these anticipated reactions were important; 
Republican candidates in 1974, for example, clearly were less 
experienced and less well bankrolled than in other years, and 
this had to have a deleterious effect on their performance at the 
polls. As Jacobson and Kernell point out, however. it would be 
hard to believe that the self-fulfilling expectations of 
4. 
s. 
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candidates and contributors are the whole story. If voters 
responded only to the relative quality of congressional 
candidates and their campaigns, experienced, well-financed 
Republican candidates would have done just as well in 1974 as in 
1972. and Republican losses in 1974 would have been entirely 
self-inflicted. Presumably this would not happen very many times 
before politicians would discover this. For evidence indicating 
that voters do respond to the state of the economy (and thus that 
politicians' anticipated reactions are not irrational) see 
Fiorina (1981) and Kiewiet (1983). 
A number of people have suspected that Maisel made his 
unsuccessful bid for Congress in order to write a book about it. 
Maisel, however, steadfastly denies this charge. 
The following chart details the calculations of the probabilities 
reported in Figure 1. S refers to the strong challenger, W 
refers to the weak challenger. A is the probability of wiILD.ing 
the primary. B is the probability of wiILD.ing the general 
election, and C is the probability that the incumbent was not 
previously defeated by the other challenger. 
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Probability of S Getting 
Elected to Congress If: A B c A*B*C 
S runs now, W runs now .90 .12 1.00 .108 
S runs now, W runs next time 1.00 .12 1.00 .120 
S runs next time, W runs now 1.00 .60 .94 .564 
S runs next time, W runs next time .90 .60 1.00 .540 
Probability of W Getting 
Elected to Congress If: 
W runs now, S runs now .10 .06 1.00 .006 
W runs now, S runs next time 1.00 .06 1.00 .060 
W runs next time, S runs now 1.00 .40 .88 .352 
W runs next time, S runs next time .10 .40 1.00 .040 
6. It should be noted that weak candidates pursuing such a strategy 
need not actually run against the incumbent. It is only required 
that potentially stronger challengers expect the incumbent to run 
for reelection and thus choose not to enter the primary. Due to 
death, serious illness, or other reasons, however, the incumbent 
may be forced to drop out unexpe�tedly after the primary filing 
dates have passed. In such a situation the weak challenger, 
having sailed through the primary, ends up running for an open 
seat. It may well be, furthermore, that the probability of such 
a situation occurring is comparable to the probability of 
actually defeating the incumbent. Whatever the case, though, the 
weak potential challenger still has an incentive to take on the 
incumbent and thereby avoid a primary. 
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